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Abstract 
Using Weber’s concept of charismatic routinisation, this article analyses the dilemmas related to political 
succession and post-charismatic order in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. While the presidents 
of these three countries have drawn their authority from a combination of charismatic, legal-rational and 
traditional authority, they have relied most heavily on charisma in particular to sustain their rule. With the 
presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan aging and facing the question of political succession, the article 
provides an analysis of the problems associated with potential for post-charismatic succession in these 
states. It does so by drawing on three of Weber’s mechanisms for charismatic routinisation: designation, 
hereditary charisma, and charisma in oﬃ  ce. The analysis demonstrates that in these three cases, despite 
charisma only having two routes available to it, traditional and legal-rational, the mixture of legal-
rational, traditional and charismatic domination undermines the process of charismatic routinisation. 
Consequently, the article argues that political succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will most likely 
evolve into a reconstitution of charismatic leadership.
Keywords: charismatic routinisation; charisma; Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, political succession.
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan respectively, 
are the only two Soviet era leaders who remain as heads of one of the ﬁ fteen successor republics 
of the former USSR. These two presidents have dominated and shaped the political systems of 
their nations. Elite discourse in both countries consistently depicts independence and sovereignty 
as inextricably tied to their personalities. Along with both post-Soviet presidents of Turkmenistan 
(Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov), Nazarbayev and Karimov can be observed 
as having their authority underpinned by a combination of Weber’s traditional, legal-rational and 
charismatic domination.1 It is charisma, however, which if often the most prominent characteristic 
of their authority. They are leaders who possess a predisposition towards personality cults, glorifying 
titles and statues, and a deifying elite-led public discourse.
Nazarbayev and Karimov are approaching the twilight of their political careers, and the issue of 
succession is the deﬁ ning question upon which the future trajectory of state development depends. 
Given the centrality of both leaders to their respective political systems, and given a generation of 
young people have never known anything but their leadership, what are the prospects for a stable 
transition to a post-charismatic order? And what are the mechanisms available to achieve such a 
transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan? While these are questions fundamental to the future of 
both countries, they are also questions that address broader issues connected to Weber’s concept of 
charismatic routinisation. 
1 Weber used the term Herrschaft, which directly translated from German means ‘domination’. However, the term 
has also been translated in English as ‘authority’. While both translations are more than adequate, this article 
prefers to use ‘domination’ as it captures better the idea of asymmetrical power relations (Guzzini, 2007).
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The very nature of charisma is ephemeral and transitory. It lasts only as long as the charismatic 
leader and, consequently, is naturally an unstable form of political domination (Toth, 1972; Weber, 
1978, p. 114). For charisma to survive and move beyond its transitory nature, it requires routinisation 
into either traditional or legal-rational forms or organisation (or both). Therefore, often in a modern 
political context the routinisation of charisma is associated with the problem of political succession 
(Ardley, 2003; Jarbawi & Pearlman, 2007). This article utilises three of Weber’s original ﬁ ve categories 
of mechanisms for charismatic routinisation (designation, hereditary charisma and charisma in oﬃ  ce) 
to analyse problems associated with charismatic routinisation in these three states and, in particular, 
to address the issue of political succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The article argues that all 
three forms of charismatic routinisation pose potential problems for any post-charismatic political 
order in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. There is a danger that designation can lead to the reconstitution 
of charismatic leadership (as the case of Turkmenistan illustrates), while hereditary charisma as a 
form of charismatic routinisation has proven vulnerable in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
to inter-elite and regime instability. Finally, ostensible attempts at charismatic routinisation through 
charisma in oﬃ  ce in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have led to an increased personalisation of power and 
a resistance from the charismatic leaders to give up power. These cases illustrate a paradox within the 
process of charismatic routinisation in a modern political context that features an amalgamation of 
the legal-rational, traditional and charismatic. Theoretically, charismatic routinisation only has two 
paths open to it (traditional and legal-rational), yet in a context whereby these forms of domination 
already exist, they serve to undermine the process of charismatic routinisation, and conversely end up 
strengthening charismatic leadership rather than ensuring its transition to more traditional or legal-
rational forms of domination. 
This article is not presenting a straightforward comparative analysis. While the three Central 
Asian states share many similarities in terms of their historical, cultural and economic development 
and their shared Soviet legacy, they have also taken divergent paths in terms of their post-Soviet 
transition (Collins, 2006). Moreover, they are at diﬀ erent places in terms of charismatic succession. 
Turkmenistan has already gone through one form of charismatic succession – but that case reveals 
something about the problems of routinising charisma in the other two states, notably how charisma 
can become reconstituted by a successor. Turkmenistan, therefore, operates as a near-approximate 
case for comparison with regards to potential pathways for charismatic routinisation in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan. 
This article presents an interpretative analysis of potential problems and dilemmas related to 
political succession and charismatic routinisation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It 
uses Weber’s concept of charismatic routinisation as an analytical frame for considering this prevalent 
issue. By using the cases of prospective charismatic successions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
the article contributes to informing the concept and mechanisms of charismatic routinisation. 
Simultaneously, however, charismatic routinisation provides an insightful frame through which to 
begin thinking about the developmental paths open to these states, given political succession is the 
most anticipated event.
Methodologically, the data collection is a little uneven as a consequence of the restricted nature of 
politics in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For Kazakhstan, the article draws on analytical reports, some 
primary interviews with political elites (undertaken by the author during various ﬁ eldtrips from 2007 
to 2014), local newspapers and government documentary sources. Not all of these types of sources 
are available in the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Consequently, there is more reliance on 
secondary sources including newspapers, opposition websites and foreign-based NGO reports. This is 
why it is not entirely possible to oﬀ er a straightforward comparative analysis, as frequently the data 
is not always completely comparable. 
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The article is broken down into two main sections. The ﬁ rst sets up the analytical frame for 
unpacking charisma and charismatic routinisation. The second section then uses Weber’s three 
mechanisms for charismatic routinisation (designation, hereditary charisma and charisma in oﬃ  ce) to 
analyse the cases of political succession and post-charismatic order in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.
Charisma and Charismatic Routinisation
A charismatic leader is followed and obeyed ‘by virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his exemplary 
qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in charisma’ (Weber, 1978, p. 
213). While originally observed as a form of domination that existed historically (and mostly related 
to religious movements without institutional structures), charisma is now widely understood to 
no longer be bound to any historical period and can exist within all kinds of complex institutional 
structures, hence the popularity of the concept in Organizational Studies (Lindholm, 1990; Dow, 1969, 
pp. 307-308; Conger, 1993). As Eatwell (2006, p. 144) notes, charisma
oﬀ ers more insights if the focus turns to charisma’s implications for the workings of government, but 
even in this context it is important not to underestimate the role of legal-bureaucratic legitimacy, nor 
to ignore the way in which traditional forms of legitimation were also present in these regimes.
Charisma is ﬂ eeting. If the followers of the charismatic leader are to maintain and ensure the 
survival of their movement in the long-term, then charisma must give up its charismatic qualities 
(Toth, 1972, p.1). This process of routinisation concerns the changing of group loyalty from one based 
on charismatic domination to a unity premised on rationally accepted rules or traditional precedent 
(Weber, 1978, p. 246; Ake, 1966, p. 2). According to Eisenstadt, the
test of any great charismatic leader lies not only in his ability to create a single event or great movement, 
but also the ability to leave a continuous impact on institutional structure – to transform any given 
institution setting by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision, by investing the regular, orderly 
oﬃ  ces, or aspects of social organisation, with some of his charismatic qualities and aura (Eisenstadt, 
1968, p. 21).
In Economy and Society, Max Weber identiﬁ es 5 possible mechanisms for the routinisation of 
charismatic domination. Arguably, two of these mechanisms (revelation and selection) are not 
appropriate for analysing Central Asian states (Weber, 1978, pp. 246-47). Both mechanisms rely on 
an administrative or legal staﬀ  to make the decision regarding the charismatic successor.  Given the 
matrix of traditional, legal-rational and charismatic domination in Central Asian states, these two 
kinds of routinisation are unlikely mechanisms for political succession in the region. Succession could 
not be decided solely by an administrative or legal staﬀ  as it would have to involve other actors – 
namely informal patrimonial elite groups (traditional), or the procedure of an election (legal-rational), 
despite how controlled that electoral process might be.
Of the three mechanisms which do complement the study of charismatic leadership succession in 
Central Asia, the ﬁ rst is the designation of a successor, either by the charismatic leader, if still alive, or 
by administrative staﬀ  or elite followers if the charismatic leader is dead. The designation of a candidate 
is a question of arriving at the correct designation, the designation of the right person who is truly endowed 
with charisma (Weber, 1978, p. 247). In contemporary political systems, however, the designated 
successor, more often than not, requires their position to be legitimized through rationalized standards 
and routines (i.e. elections). This process, the attempt to mesh the legal-rational with the charismatic, 
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creates a number of dilemmas for the charismatic followers (elites) or existing charismatic leader, 
which undermine the progression of charismatic routinisation. First, by going through the procedure 
of an election, whether that process is controlled or not, the charismatic successor is endowed with 
a legitimacy separate from the charismatic leader or followers whom designated their position in the 
ﬁ rst instance. Second, this gives the successor the opportunity to reconstitute charismatic domination, 
but this time in their image. Third, it creates an elite coordination dilemma. In possessing their own 
legitimacy and reconstituting a form of charismatic domination, the successor is then able to move 
against those followers who placed him/her in a position of power, thus consolidating their leadership 
and authority. Finally, in instances where the charismatic leader remains on the scene and designates 
a successor, such a process of routinisation risks a potential ‘lame-duck’ syndrome, which can lead elite 
defection and the emergence of a consolidated elite opposition capable of mobilising society against 
either the existing charismatic leader and/or their designated successor (Hale, 2005, p. 135). 
Hereditary charisma is the second of these three forms of routinisation applicable to the case of 
Central Asia. Here charisma is institutionalised through dynastic means (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. 21-22). 
According to Weber, this form of routinisation could lead in the direction either of traditionalization or 
of legalization (Weber, 1978, p. 248). In the case of hereditary charisma, an obvious successor emerges 
because of their familial connection with the existing charismatic leader. However, while such a 
mechanism may seem obvious in the aftermath of the death of a charismatic leader, speculation 
around dynastic succession while a charismatic leader is still alive can lead to two problems. First, 
it can create potential inter-elite rivalry and instability. Jealousy can arise amongst the charismatic 
followers and administrative staﬀ  should a dynastic successor attempt to claim pole position for 
succession. Certain powerful sections of the elite will seek to weaken potential dynastic successors’ 
power bases and destabilise their eﬀ orts to take power. Second, if still alive, the charismatic leader 
can also move against potential dynastic successors who are observed as moving too early in their 
endeavour to take power. In such instances, the existing charismatic leader may seek to marginalise 
potential dynastic successors and divorce them from the resources, interests and existing power bases. 
The ﬁ nal mechanism involves the transmission of charisma by way of oﬃ  ce. This involves a 
dissociation of charisma from a particular individual, making it an objective transferable entity, which 
can then be enshrined in ritual acts and rules pertaining to a form of public oﬃ  ce (Weber, 1978, p. 
276). Here charisma becomes embodied within an institutional reality, which attempts to reform 
the existing political and social order by divesting charismatic power into rational-legal oﬃ  ces of 
the bureaucratic state. In Central Asia, this can be most commonly observed in the way power is 
channelled downwards from the charismatic leader to the legislature and some of the political parties 
which constitute the legislature. Ostensibly the objective is to impersonalise power by rooting it ﬁ rmly 
within a formal institutional framework. Theoretically, institutions such as parliaments or parties, 
divested with some of the charismatic leader’s power, would then be able to provide a mechanism 
through which a post-charismatic leader would materialise. For instance, a parliament could be 
imbued with greater power and responsibilities vis-à-vis the charismatic leader in terms of policy-
making and the creation of the government. The largest party in the parliament could then provide a 
role in terms of elite recruitment for important political oﬃ  ces from which a talent pool of potential 
successors to the charismatic leader would emerge. There are at least two distinct problems with 
such a process. First, to work eﬀ ectively the formal institutions concerned require a genuine degree of 
agency separate from the charismatic leader, otherwise this form of routinisation can lead to a further 
concentration of charismatic power. If the legislature, and the largest party within that legislature, 
remains but an extension of the charismatic leader and is unable to inﬂ uence decision-making, then 
faith (legitimacy) in its ability to play an important role in mediating the succession process to a post-
charismatic political order is fatally undermined. Second, in a context where the charismatic leader is 
still alive, despite attempts to ensure a stable succession, the leader can often ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to give 
up the reins of power and, therefore, will delay any succession process.
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The three mechanisms for charismatic routinisation (see Table 1.) need to be understood in 
the speciﬁ c context of Central Asian politics. All three presidents are perceived to legitimise their 
domination on the basis of a combination of personalised charismatic authority; a traditional 
authority premised upon real and ﬁ ctive kinship based clan identities; and through rational-legal 
means (e.g. elections, constitutional order, and bureaucratic modes of governance). This article does 
not seek to retread this familiar ground. These three diﬀ erent aspects have been covered signiﬁ cantly 
elsewhere (Isaacs, 2013; Collins, 2006; Kazantsev, 2007; Kangas, 2002; Melvin, 2000; Georg Geiss, 2003). 
We can, therefore, make the assumption that all these forms of domination play a role, some larger 
than others and some more signiﬁ cant at diﬀ erent times than others; nonetheless, they all remain 
relevant for the political, social and economic order of these three Central Asian states. What is 
important, however, is that any form of charismatic routinisation that takes place has to do so in 
a context whereby the other two forms of domination exist. Given charismatic routinisation only 
has two paths available to it (either traditional or legal-rational), what is striking is that in the cases 
below existing forms of traditional or legal-rational domination have tended to undermine attempts 
at charismatic routinisation. 
Table 1: Mechanisms for charismatic routinisation in the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan
Form of 
charismatic 
routinisation 
Description Dilemmas associated with the mechanism
Designation The designation of a post-
charismatic successor by 
either the followers (elites) 
of the charismatic leader or 
the charismatic leader (if still 
alive). In the modern context, 
the designation then has to 
be aﬃ  rmed through a wider 
electoral process. 
1. Electoral process provides charismatic successor with 
legitimacy separate from charismatic followers (or 
charismatic leader) who designated them.
2. Separate base of legitimacy enables successor to 
reconstitute their version of a charismatic leadership.
3. Separate base of legitimacy empowers successor 
to move against charismatic followers (elites) who 
designated them to the position of leader. 
4. In instances where the existing charismatic leader 
designates a successor, it can lead to a ‘lame duck’ 
syndrome, elite defection and a challenge to their rule.
Hereditary The attempt (or perceived 
attempt) to divest power 
dynastically, hence, the 
institutionalisation of 
charismatic leadership in the 
family.
1. Hereditary charisma provokes elite instability. Rival 
elite groups may seek to destabilise potential dynastic 
successors’ claim to the leadership. 
2. Alternatively, if still active, the charismatic leader may 
move against potential dynastic successors if they 
make their ambitions for succession too prominent. 
Charisma in 
oﬃ  ce
Attempts to devolve personal 
power held by the charismatic 
leader to formal legal-rational 
political institutions. Examples 
of this include constitutional 
reform and the empowerment 
of legislatures and their 
constituent political parties, 
vis-à-vis the charismatic leader.
1. Constitutional reforms leads to an increasing 
personalisation of power because of the lack of 
independent agency of legislatures and parties
2. If still alive, the charismatic leader has a resistance 
to leaving power – which is often driven by external 
events and insecurities because of the need to leave a 
stable legacy.
Source: author’s compilation, adapted from Weber, 1978
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Designation of Charisma in Central Asia
In Central Asia, designation as a form of charismatic political succession has already taken place in 
Turkmenistan with the death of Saparumurat Niyazov, the ﬁ rst post-Soviet president of the country. 
Therefore, Turkmenistan is a useful approximate case for exploring the problems of designation and 
what this can reveal in terms of potential processes of designation in Kazakhstan.2
Designation establishes a ‘legitimation’ problem for the charismatic followers. In the modern 
context, it is not simply the case that elite followers of the charismatic leader (or the charismatic 
leader, if still alive) can simply designate the successor, as elections still have an important role. 
Indeed, elections represent the key element of charismatic routinisation, as they pertain to the legal-
rational element with which charismatic leadership is to be regularised. The designated successor, 
once elected through competitive, albeit controlled, elections is then endowed with their own 
legitimacy separate from the followers or charismatic leader, who designated them as a successor. 
This legal-rational legitimacy points to the ongoing importance of formal institutions (in this instance 
regularised elections and the oﬃ  ce of the presidency); but also a dilemma for the followers. The 
successor now has space to establish their own political movement separate from the followers of 
the previous charismatic leader, which can then result in the followers losing access to the resources 
and interests they wished to maintain in the ﬁ rst instance.
It is this kind of legitimation problem which appeared in the Turkmen case. In the immediate 
aftermath of Saparmurat Niyazov’s death, a close coterie of elites moved quickly to designate a 
successor who would be capable of maintaining elite stability. Elite powerbrokers such as Akmurat 
Redzhepov (Head of the Presidential Guard) and Akrammed Rakhmanov (Minister of Interior) moved 
rapidly in the hours after Niyazov’s death to remove the Chairman of the Mejilis (Parliament) and 
the constitutionally designated successor Oraz Atayev, and instead place Berdymukhamedov in the 
presidency (Peyrouse, 2011, pp. 109-110; Horák, 2012). Berdymukhamedov emerged as the preferred 
choice as he was believed to meet the desirable criteria, which would ensure elite stability: he was 
from the Ahalteke tribe; he was young and potentially popular with the wider public; and, most 
importantly, he would be someone who would not acquire substantial dominance over members of 
the inner core elite (Horák, 2010, p. 38). Berdymukhamedov’s appointment as acting president was 
conﬁ rmed by a competitive election in February 2007 against 5 nominal and non-threatening 
candidates.3 Nonetheless, the legal-rational legitimacy obtained through the election empowered 
Berdymukhamedov as a leader in his own right. Any sense that he was a puppet ﬁ gure of powerful ‘grey 
cardinals’ who operated the levers of power behind the scene in some form of oligarchy were soon 
dispelled when both Rakhmanov and Redzhepov were removed from their post by Berdymukhamedov 
(Zygar, 2007).
The legitimacy obtained from the presidential election provided Berdymukhamedov with the 
opportunity to establish a charismatic form of domination in his image. After side-lining and moving 
against those elites who placed him in power, he was able to slowly decommission the charismatic 
domination of Niyazov and replace it with his own. Portraits of Berdymukhamedov adorn public 
2 The focus on Kazakhstan as a potential site for charismatic designation occurring as a form of post-charismatic 
political succession is not to rule out the possibility of such a form of routinisation in Uzbekistan. It is diﬃ  cult 
to determine the likelihood regarding such a process taking place in Uzbekistan. This is largely to do with the 
paucity of resources available to scholars regarding the internal dynamics of the Karimov regime. This is a con-
sequence of the restricted ability to undertake primary research on political matters in Uzbekistan and the lack 
of open and transparent media sources in the country. Therefore, for the purposes of this article it is better not 
to address the issue of designation in Uzbekistan as for the most part it would have been too speculative.
3 The ﬁ ve candidates were all from the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) and shared similar programmes 
regarding continuing the international and domestic policies of Niyazov (OSCE/ODHIR, 2007). They were per-
ceived as not being genuine contenders to Berdymukhamedov and were standing in order to create the impres-
sion of a contested election (Peyrouse, 2012, p. 109).
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buildings, statues of his image have been erected in public places, his image hangs like a religious 
icon in aircraft cabins of the state carrier Turkmenistan Airlines, and books he has claimed to have 
authored are used in public education (Eurasianet, 2010; Sadykov, 2014). Berdymukhamdeov’s is also 
gloriﬁ ed in a state discourse, which views him as the creator, founder and inspiration for the Great 
Renaissance of Turkmenistan, a new stage in the country’s development (Polese & Horák, 2015). He is 
hailed as the Milli Leader (National Leader) and his special qualities are frequently emphasised in state 
media discourse. For example, his prowess as a horse rider is habitually highlighted, despite taking 
a spectacular public tumble from a horse at the Ashgabat Hippodrome in April 2013. Footage also 
regularly airs on Turkmen state TV of Berdymukhamedov performing as a guitarist, singer and even 
techno DJ in front of adoring audiences (Eurasianet, 2014).
Designation in this instance has only led to the reconstitution of charisma. Any hopes power brokers 
Redzhepov and Rakhmanov had that they would be able to keep a tight hold on Berdymukhedov and 
limit the charismatic aspect of his leadership were undermined by the legitimacy Berdymukhamedov 
gained through elections. It bequeathed him with a separate legitimacy from that provided by those 
elites who designated him the successor. While elections can represent a routinised and rationalised 
development in terms of the process of succession, it also opens up space to allow charismatic 
domination to re-emerge. It is important to note that Berdymukhamedov’s form of charismatic 
leadership is diﬀ erent from that of Niyazov’s. Berdymukhamedov is presented as a reformer who 
is oﬀ ering a type of Khrushchevian thaw, albeit an extremely limited thaw, through his willingness 
to open Turkmenistan up to the international sphere. Nevertheless, such a shift in policy is a 
consequence of the need to attract more foreign direct investment into the country (Peyrouse, 2012). 
Nonetheless, questions that dogged Niyazov’s leadership now persist with Berdymukhamedov. How 
do you transition from another charismatic personality cult? How do you replace a form of domination 
characterised by such a heavy emphasis on charisma and the special place and qualities of the leader?
Designation is often seen as the most likely scenario for succession in Kazakhstan. As Roberts has 
suggested, prior to 2005…most Kazakhstanis were not concerned about succession issues and assumed that 
Nazarbayev would be followed either by a “hand-picked” protégé, known locally as the ‘Yeltsin model’, or 
by a member of his own family, often referred to as the ‘Aliyev model’ (Roberts, 2012, p. 2).4 However, as 
discussed below, the prospect for such a form of designation has proven problematic in both instances. 
The problem with the dynastic ‘Aliyev’ model will be discussed later in the section on hereditary 
charisma. However, the ‘hand-picked’ successor model has also created a dilemma in the process of 
political succession in Kazakhstan. Instances of post-Soviet transition whereby a successor has been 
designated in advance have often led to regime instability and the so-called ‘coloured revolutions’ 
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Roberts, 2012, pp. 2-3). With power observed as drifting away 
from the leader, because of their lame duck position, elites become disgruntled and uncertain of 
the extent to which their interests will be met under the newly designated leader. Dissatisﬁ ed elites 
can then draw on popular discontent with the existing leader to mobilise against the regime and 
take power (Hale, 2005).5 Despite the persistent speculation over the last decade that Nazarbayev 
has been planning to hand power over to a designated successor, he has failed to do so. Instead he 
has concentrated power further into his personality (see below), which suggests a degree of fear 
over the consequences of a ‘chosen successor’ model, in light of the examples of Georgia, Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan. Naturally, these are diﬀ erent countries with diﬀ erent contexts, each with a unique 
set of political variables that could inﬂ uence the outcome of such a form of designation. There is 
no guarantee a designated successor model in Kazakhstan would follow the pattern of events that 
unfolded in the ‘coloured revolution’ states. Nonetheless, the unfolding of those transitions of power 
must weigh heavily on the mind of Nazarbayev when considering options for succession.
4 Named after Ilham Aliyev who succeed his long-serving father Heydar Aliyev as president of Azerbaijan.
5 Of course there are all kinds of factors which can contribute to the success of such popular mobilisations such 
as a united opposition, relatively free and independent media, and a divided security service (McFaul, 2005).
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The fact Nazarbayev has not provided, at least publicly, any indication for a preferred successor or a 
model or mechanism for a transfer of power from his charismatic leadership, has led political analysts 
in Kazakhstan to consider the options and scenarios for a post-Nazarbayev order. The ﬁ rst scenario 
depicts a model where the vacuum created by Nazarbayev’s exit (either through death, incapacity or 
voluntary exit without a clear plan of succession) creates a collapse of the system where the elites (or 
charismatic followers) under Nazarbayev ﬁ ght amongst themselves, leading to conﬂ ict and potential 
civil war (Satpayev, Umbetalieva, Chebotarev, Zhumaly, Kadyrzhanov, Karazhan, Sarym, & Zhusupova, 
2013; Isabeva, 2012). Such a prospect highlights the unstable nature of Nazarbayev’s charismatic 
domination. In fact, by seemingly rejecting a ‘chosen one’ designated succession model Nazarbayev 
has only consolidated the personalist and charismatic nature of his leadership (see below).
The second suggested scenario is that the elite groups under Nazarbayev will coalesce and attempt 
to rule collectively with a designated successor chosen as a ﬁ gurehead of some kind of oligarchic 
power structure (Isabeva, 2012). However, the dangers of such a ﬁ gurehead, or ‘puppet’, are eminently 
demonstrated in the case of Berdymukhamedov in Turkmenistan. The role of elections will gift any 
chosen successor a degree of legitimacy, and thus authority, separate from those that put the successor 
in power. Naturally, we should not read too much into a comparison between Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. There are signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences between the two cases. Elite groups in Kazakhstan have 
far greater ﬁ nancial and political autonomy, and thus stronger foundations for a personal political 
base, than any powerful elites in Turkmenistan. This could stand them in good stead in terms of 
holding oﬀ  any attempt by a designated successor to erode their power.
This section, using the examples of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, has sought to highlight the 
dilemmas involved in attempting a form of charismatic routinisation through the mechanism of 
designation. As noted above, the complex interplay evident in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan between 
legal-rational and charismatic domination serves to undermine the process of designation as a method 
of charismatic routinisation in that it is the legal-rational element of the process (elections) which 
provides a successor with legitimacy to re-constitute charismatic leadership.
Hereditary Charisma in Central Asia
Weber’s second mechanism for charismatic routinisation this article considers concerns the attempt 
to divest charismatic domination through dynastic succession. This is most evident in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. Given the opaqueness of familial and intra-elite politics in Central Asia, it is not clear 
whether the potential of dynastic succession is a phenomenon driven by the incumbent presidents or 
is a consequence of the political ambition of their progeny. The extent to which the succession process 
in both countries remains publically unresolved, despite the aging of Karimov and Nazarbayev and 
frequent media speculations of ill health, suggests that the prospect of dynastic succession is driven 
by the political aspirations of the presidents’ children (and relations) who hope to rise to power on 
the coattails of their fathers’ charisma. In the last decade, there has been ceaseless speculation that 
Gulnara Karimova is being primed to succeed her father as president in Uzbekistan, and on various 
occasions Dariga Nazarbayeva, her husband Rakhat Aliev, and Nursultan Nazarbayev’s second son-in-
law, Timur Kulibayev, have been favourited to succeed the president (Andersen, 2005; Markus, 2005; 
Shermatova, 2006; Mukhamedzhan, 2011).
In all of the cases of potential dynastic succession, the candidates typically have signiﬁ cant assets 
and resources across multiple business sectors such as energy, banking, investment and the media 
(Podelco, 2009; Uznews, 2010; Isaacs, 2011, p. 67). Additionally, all have opted to use political parties 
to wield inﬂ uence. Karimova is reportedly close to the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, while 
Nazarbayeva and Aliev set up Asar (Together), and Kulibayev is alleged to be behind the Atameken 
Business Union, whose former Chairman Azat Peruashev was elevated to leader of the political party 
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Ak Zhol (Bright Path) in July 2011. It is now suggested by some commentators that Ak Zhol has now 
emerged as a political party, which through Peruashev is promoting Kulibayev’s interests (Ak Zhaiyk, 
2012). 
For these ﬁ gures, it is perceivable that business interests, alongside the use of a political party, 
provide them with the economic and political means to succeed their fathers. Both Karimov and 
Nazarbayev have established strong authoritarian regimes which are held ﬁ rm by the magnetism 
of their personal leadership. There is no guarantee that any potential successor would be able to 
achieve a similar hold over the public or elites. However, such attempts of hereditary charismatic 
routinisation have led to instability. First, hereditary charisma has led to bouts of internal elite 
instability in Uzbekistan as competing elite groups have moved against Karimova. Second, in the case 
of Kazakhstan, attempts at hereditary charisma have resulted in Nazarbayev moving against members 
of his own family. This is because Aliev and Nazarbayeva were seen as accruing too much power and 
inﬂ uence and seeking to replace Nazarbayev too early.
Inter-elite instability
Gulnara Karimova’s attempts to succeed her father in Uzbekistan illustrate the extent to which 
hereditary succession can lead to inter-elite instability. Aside from one WikiLeaks cable, which described 
Gulnara as the ‘most hated person in Uzbekistan’, her political and economic empire building has 
attracted reprisal from competing sections of the Uzbek elite, most notably the National Security 
Service (SNB) (Fitzpatrick, 2010). Gulnara’s anticipated dynastic succession created an informal battle 
to replace Karimov within sections of the Uzbek elite primarily between Karimova, long-serving 
Prime Minister Shavkat Mirzijaeva, the Finance Minister Rustam Azimov, and head of the SNB Rustam 
Inoyatov (Kilmenko, 2013). Some suggest that this inter-elite competition to replace Karimov is a 
symptom of informal clan-based conﬂ ict between the Samarkand, Tashkent and Ferghana clans 
(Regnum, 2010). Such an interpretation of events, however, overlooks the extent to which Karimov 
has sought to remove the ‘clan politics’ element from Uzbekistani politics (Karimov, 1997). Karimov, 
not too dissimilar to Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, has constructed a neopatrimonial system where 
loyalty to him as the patron, and a balancing of elite groups, ensures the stability of the political order 
(Ilkhamov, 2007). Regional analysts believe that Karimov has suﬃ  ciently reduced the inﬂ uence of clan 
politics to the extent that it will not play a large role in the succession process (Malashenko, 2014, p. 
14).
This behind doors inter-elite tension became publicly evident in 2013, when a war of words broke 
out between Gulnara, her sister and mother, and the security services. Gulnara claimed her mother 
and sister had vowed to destroy her and that the security services, acting at the behest of Rustam 
Inoyatov, were harassing her entourage and had conspired to poison her (Sadykov, 2013). Karimova 
and her partner Rustam Madumarov also found themselves embroiled in international criminal cases 
related to their international businesses practices, especially the allegation that Karimova was paid 
$300 million by a Finnish telecommunications company, Teliasonara, for the rights to enter the Uzbek 
market (Malashenko, 2014, pp. 7-8). The release of Kompromat (compromising information) implicating 
Karimova in corruption scandals (believed to emanate from the SNB), domestically and internationally, 
stalled her attempt to place herself in the prime position to succeed her father (Uznews.net, 2013).
The case of Uzbekistan is revealing for the way in which hereditary charismatic routinisation is 
especially problematic in political systems where authority is legitimised through a combination of all 
three forms of Weber’s domination. Gulnara Karimova’s unconcealed attempt to succeed her father 
reignited inter-elite tensions based on an informal, traditional and patrimonial form of authority. 
While there is some debate as to whether these ‘traditional’ clans are formed on kinship-based ties or 
formal regional divisions, what it highlights is the way in which hereditary charisma can be displaced 
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or marginalised by traditional politics.6 Such inter-elite clan competition is evident in Kazakhstan, 
where Rakhat Aliev’s fall from grace was precipitated by such inter-elite factionalism, as well as the 
stubbornness of the charismatic leader to remain in power. Nonetheless, hereditary charisma does 
not always face these problems. Ilham Aliev’s succeeding of his father in Azerbaijan demonstrates the 
conditions in which it is possible for a genetic heir to succeed their charismatic parent. In this case, 
during the consolidating of his position in the Soviet period Heydar Aliev was able to build support 
across both the main competing clans in the country (Nakhchivan and Yerazi clans) because of his 
hereditary links to both groups (Cornell, 2011). This broad base of support across the main competing 
clan groups ensured a smooth and relatively conﬂ ict-free transition of power for Ilham Aliev (Guliyev, 
2012, p. 117). The failure of a dynastic successor to take account of building a broad base of support 
among factional elite groups can contribute to explaining the failure of hereditary charisma as a form 
of charismatic rounisation in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Charismatic leader moves against potential dynastic successor
A second problem with hereditary charisma, as observed in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
is that if an obvious dynastic successor emerges while the charismatic leader is still alive and healthy, 
the leader may see it as a threat to their position. For instance, the point at which Rakhat Aliev accrued 
too much economic and political inﬂ uence in Kazakhstan was the moment that his father-in-law 
moved against him and Dariga. In 2007 Aliev was charged with kidnapping two NurBank directors and 
after ﬂ eeing abroad was forcibly divorced from his business interests in Kazakhstan, as well as his wife 
Dariga (Zonakz, 2007a). Dariga, for her part, was isolated politically and was not returned on the party 
list for Nur Otan7 in the 2007 parliamentary election.8 In the aftermath of the Aliev aﬀ air, Kulibayev 
was also demoted from his position as deputy chairman of Samruk (the state holding company). For 
some commentators, while this may have seemed like a balancing of elite groupings with the ejection 
of Aliev, it evolved into a strengthening of Kulibayev’s position and eventually he was appointed head 
of Samruk-Kazyna in 2011 (the refashioned Samruk) (Samigullina, 2007). However, Kulibayev again lost 
his position in the aftermath of violence in the oil town of Zhanozen in December 2011, and on the 
back of the constant drip-drip of speculation that he was being primed as the successor to Nazarbayev. 
Similarly, the sideling of Karimova during 2013-14 illustrates that when a charismatic leader is not 
ready to give up the reins of power they can move against potential dynastic successors. In 2014, it 
was widely reported that Karimova had been put under house arrest, allegedly at the behest of the 
president. There are two interpretations for why this occurred. The ﬁ rst is that Karimova had failed 
to conceal her desire to replace her father as president and thus represented a threat to Karimov’s 
authority (Uznews, 2014). The other is that international criminal proceedings against Karimova 
undermined the international reputation of the president. Consequently, it is perceived she now 
represents a liability for her father and this is the reason for why the president moved against his 
daughter, as he is concerned with his reputation in the West (Economist, 2014). This also illuminates 
the inﬂ uence of external actors on potential succession processes.
6 There is debate within the Central Asian politics literature as to whether clans in the region are based on kin-
ship or ﬁ ctive kinship-based ties or formal regional and Soviet institutionalised divisions (Jones Luong, 2002; 
Collins, 2006). However, others have argued that essentially this debate simply concerns factionalism in the 
region (Gulette, 2007); and that such factionalism structures the competition for political and economic re-
sources and thus is the main forum for the contestation of politics (Isaacs, 2011).
7 Dariga Nazarbayeva’s Asar party was forcibly merged with the president’s party Otan in December 2006, forming 
the super-presidential party Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland)
8 For the 2012 parliamentary election, however, Dariga was back in the fold and back on the party list for Nur 
Otan. She currently serves as the leader of the Nur Otan faction in the Mazhilis and is deputy speaker of the 
parliament.
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The cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, so far, illustrate the extent to which pre-empted attempts 
of dynastic charismatic succession are destabilising. As the two cases demonstrate, it can lead to a 
heightening of inter-elite tensions, usually premised upon a traditional form of political relations 
and behaviour, which displaces the carefully balanced nature of inter-elite relations upon which the 
charismatic leader’s authority rests. It exempliﬁ es again the way in which charismatic routinisation 
can be undermined by other types of domination, which hitherto were ostensibly the forms of 
authority the charisma was to be routinised into.
Charisma in Oﬃ  ce in Central Asia
The ﬁ nal mechanism of charismatic routinisation this article explores is charisma in oﬃ  ce. Charisma 
in oﬃ  ce can be understood as the transmission or attempted transmission of personal charismatic 
power into formal legal-rational political institutions. In the case of Central Asia, this type of attempted 
charismatic routinisation can be observed through the divesting of power to legislatures (and their 
constituent political parties) through constitutional reform.
Divesting of power to legislatures through constitutional reform
Attempts of routinising charismatic power in Central Asia through formal oﬃ  ce have typically taken 
the form of constitutional reform, which is solicited by a presidential administration ostensibly 
to introduce democratic change, instituting a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form 
of government. The ﬁ rst observable attempt of this form of charismatic routinisation occurred in 
Kazakhstan in 2007 with a raft of constitutional changes. The constitutional amendments among 
others included: the Prime Minister to be appointed by the president only after consultation with 
parliamentary factions and with the consent of a majority of deputies; the presidential term of oﬃ  ce 
reduced from seven to ﬁ ve years; and an increase in parliamentary deputies from 77 to 107. The 
perceived shifting of responsibility for the appointment of the Prime Minister to the largest party 
faction is emblematic of a shifting of domination rooted in Nazarbayev’s perceived charisma to one 
legitimised by the routine of legal-rational norms. As such, the reforms were presented by the president 
as the political modernisation of Kazakhstan and the strengthening of democracy in the country 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 2007). Supporters of President Nazarbayev claimed that with the parliament 
having more responsibilities, and powers being passed from the head of the state to the parliament, that 
it would create a balance of power and… represent great changes and a great step for the political system 
[Altynhash Dzhaganova, 2007].9
Islam Karimov also sought an opportunity to routinise his personal authority and pave the way for 
a stable succession in Uzbekistan. For instance, similar to the constitutional changes that Nazarbayev 
brought about in 2007, Karimov introduced changes in 2010 to the constitution, which ostensibly 
transferred presidential powers to the prime minister and parliament (Tolipov, 2010). Rather than 
being appointed by the president, this power of patronage was removed and responsibility shifted 
to the largest party grouping in the parliament (RFE/RL, 2011). Changes to the Uzbek constitution 
were also interpreted as providing an institutional (and legal-rational) mechanism to manage the 
succession process (Malashenko, 2014, p. 1). Further reforms were also announced in a draft law 
presented to the Oliy Majilis in March 2014, which would see the constitution amended and a transfer 
of powers from the president to the prime minister, legislature and its constituent parties. While the 
9 Author’s interview with Altynshash Dzhaganova, former leader of the party Rukhaniyat (Spirituality), 13 March 
2007, Astana, Kazakhstan.
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draft law was praised for furthering democratic reform in the country, detail about what powers 
precisely would be devolved where absent, and there has been no evident movement with regards to 
these changes since (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2014).
Eﬀ orts at charismatic routinisation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through constitutional reform 
reveal two problems related to the process of political succession: ﬁ rst, it has actually led to a further 
concentration of personal power; and second it is further undermined by the resistance of the 
charismatic leader to giving up power.
Concentration of personal power
Constitutional reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has a habit of only cementing the personal 
power of the presidents because of the failure of formal institutions, primarily the legislature, to have 
any agency or autonomy from the leader. In the case of Nazarbayev, while he gave away the power 
to appoint the prime minister to the leader of the largest party faction in parliament, that largest 
party faction was Nur Otan, his political party, which in 2007 won all the seats in the parliament in 
the parliamentary election, and which continues to be the largest party in parliament.10 The party acts 
mainly on the request of the president and possesses no autonomy from the president. Its election 
platforms are taken directly from the president’s annual speech of any given year and it has no role 
in policy-making, only existing to push through the president’s legislative agenda (Nur Otan, 2007; 
2011). Scholars argue that unless it develops the agency to shape policy and political events separately 
from the president, the party will be as transitory as Nazarbayev’s leadership (Isaacs & Whitmore, 
2014). Therefore, the attempt to routinse charismatic power downwards to the legislature fails, if the 
legislature is dominated by the acolytes of the charismatic leader.
The failure of the 2007 reforms to genuinely disperse power from the charismatic leadership of 
Nazarbayev was further evident when the president presented Kazakhstan’s long-term 2050 strategy 
in January 2014. While the document predominately outlines an economic strategy for Kazakhstan’s 
further modernisation and intent to become one of the top 30 competitive nations in the world, it 
also features a commitment to the strengthening of democracy and parliamentary power in particular 
(Nazarbayev, 2014). If the constitutional reform of 2007 had really been successful in divesting power, 
then there would have been no need for further commitments to the exact same principle in 2014.
Similarly, in Uzbekistan the ability of the legislature or political party to take advantage of 
supposed ‘new’ powers is limited. For some local analysts, this is because of the gap between de 
jure and de facto application of the law (Tolipov, 2010). While there may be a commitment within 
constitutional law to the divesting of power to the legislature and parties, in practice this power is 
not utilised. Instead the parliament is weak in terms of its independent parliamentary activities, so despite 
these rights, deputies are passive, non-independent and do not express alternative views (Tolipov, 2010). 
Thus, the parliament is dominated by pro-Karimov parties, and they are likely to follow his suggestion 
for prime ministerial nominee. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that the largest party faction in the 
Oliy Majilis nominates the prime minister has little bearing on their ability to play a role in choosing 
the successor to the president should he die in oﬃ  ce. Prior to the constitutional changes of 2010-11, 
the constitutional successor, should the president die in oﬃ  ce, was the prime minister. As part of 
the constitutional reform, the designated constitutional successor was amended so it became the 
chairman of the Senate (the upper chamber of Uzbekistan’s bicameral legislature). This is a post held 
10 In the aftermath of the 2007 election in which Nur Otan was the only party to surpass the 7 percent threshold 
and thus won all the seats in the Mazhilis, the presidential administration pushed forward legislation which 
sought to ensure that there would always be more than one party in the parliament. Thus, at the 2012 parlia-
mentary election, two other parties were able to surpass the threshold and obtain a small share of seats in the 
legislature. Ak Zhol won 8 seats and the Communist Peoples Party of Kazakhstan won 7 seats. Both parties are 
not seen as oﬀ ering a genuine challenge to and oversight of Nazarbayev and Nur Otan, rather they are seen as 
broadly pro-Nazarbayev.
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since 2006 by the little-known Ilgizar Sobirov, who is not taken seriously as a long-term successor and, 
as in the case of the Turkmen succession process, could quite easily be removed from his post in any 
transfer of power if Karimov were to die in oﬃ  ce (Ilkhamov & Fitzpatrick, 2010). 
What this illustrates is that parliaments and parties are tightly controlled by the presidential 
administration in each country and, therefore, are short of any genuine institutional agency to take 
advantage of the legal-rational legitimacy they possess in constitutional terms. This has important 
consequences for their ability to shape political process and in particular the process of charismatic 
routinisation and political succession.
Resistance to leaving power
Charismatic routinisation through charisma in oﬃ  ce is further problematised if the charismatic leader 
is still alive and ﬁ nds it diﬃ  cult to lay down the reins of power. The lure of power is thus often diﬃ  cult 
to resist. Despite attempts to arrange a succession, aware that making plans prior to dying improves 
the prospects of their legacy remaining intact, charismatic leaders ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to pass on the mantle 
to a successor. Instead there is a further consolidation of their charismatic leadership. The case of 
Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan neatly exempliﬁ es this key dilemma. This was perhaps most evident with 
the introduction of the ‘leader of the nation’ legislation in 2010, in which loyal deputies in the Mazhilis 
proposed legislation conferring the title ‘Elbasi’ (leader of the Kazakh nation) on Nazarbayev. The 
legislation gave Nazarbayev the ﬁ nal say in the country’s domestic and foreign policy in the event that he 
leaves oﬃ  ce, and also provides ‘the ﬁ rst president of Kazakhstan’ with lifetime immunity from investigation 
or prosecution (Pannier, 2010). The legislation, therefore, ensures that should Nazarbayev transfer 
power to another leader, or downwards to the parliament, he will still possess informal, personal 
and charismatic oversight of the political system. If anything, the leader of the nation legislation only 
sought to entrench his charismatic authority, embodying his unique and special status in the political 
system and the principle that Nazarbayev was the fundamental basis of the nation-state. This was 
evident in those clauses which in eﬀ ect, made any attempt on the president’s life an act of terrorism 
and made a criminal act out of insulting the president (Yakubov, 2010).
From as far back as 2007, Nazarbayev has purportedly been planning a succession. He is a man 
concerned with his legacy, and initially the constitutional reform of 2007 was seen to be the beginning 
of this process.11 ‘Operation Successor’ was also reportedly in full swing by 2012, and then in 2013 
Nazarbayev himself mentioned for the ﬁ rst time the transfer of power (Guljan, 2012). In a documentary 
aired on the state channel KTK, Nazarbayev was seen in soft-focus as human for the ﬁ rst time, and 
he talked openly about laying down a stable system for the change of power (Nurmuhanbetov, 2013). He 
cited Singapore and Malaysia as role models for Kazakhstan, where long-serving leaders used formal 
political institutions for such a transition of power (Nurmuhanbetov, 2013). However, since the airing 
of the documentary any talk of succession has been halted and reports suggest the president will not 
countenance any further discussion on succession and that he plans to remain in power for at least 
another 10 years (Kalashnikova, 2014). One local observer suggested that events in Ukraine had seen 
the presidential administration withdraw plans for an orderly and planned transition, fearful of the 
potential power vacuum in Kazakhstan without his leadership and the extent to which instability 
could arise either internally or externally from the inﬂ uence of Russia.  Consequently, while the lure of 
power is strong for charismatic leaders, contingent events can also impact on the timing of any given 
transition process. Thus, the twin pressures of both the resistance of an existing charismatic leader to 
giving up their position, and the inﬂ uence of external contingent events on any succession process, 
make the routinisation of charisma into institutional oﬃ  ce a challenging and diﬃ  cult process which 
has limited chances of success.
11 Author’s interview with local journalist, 4 November 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
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As in Kazakhstan, the alterations to the Uzbek constitution in 2010 have not led to the 
democratisation of the country, neither have they paved the way for institutions to play a genuine 
role in the succession process. This despite claims at the time they would play an important role in 
managing the process of succession to Karimov (Narodetsky, 2010). Instead, analysts suggest that 
Karimov is reluctant to give over power to such formal institutions and that he will hold power to 
the very end (Uznews, 2014). Like recent suggestions in Kazakhstan that Nazarbayev does not wish to 
countenance discussion of succession any longer, Karimov too wishes to halt all conversations about 
a successor (Uznews, 2014). Reports on Uzbekistan consistently speak of a failure to have a clear plan 
for succession, despite persistent rumours regarding Karimov’s ill health (Lillis, 2013). This implies 
that Karimov has no intention or interest in handing power over to a successor, and there is no clear 
evidence to suggest that he intends to.
In regimes where there is a heavy emphasis on charisma, underpinned by patrimonial traditional 
relations of power, and legitimised for domestic and international audiences by elections, charismatic 
routinisation is diﬃ  cult to achieve through charisma in oﬃ  ce. This is especially the case when the 
charismatic leader remains alive. The examples of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan illustrate that it leads 
only to a furthering of the personalisation of charismatic domination and reluctance on the part 
of the charismatic leader to give up the reins of power. This means that when the leader dies, the 
only path realistically available for the routinising of charisma is designation. As highlighted above in 
the case of Turkmenistan, this can come with its own set of problems because of the legitimacy it 
endows the designated successor with and the potential opportunity it aﬀ ords for the reconstitution 
of charismatic domination.
Concluding Remarks
The above examination remains cautionary given it comprises of an analysis of events both which 
have occurred and those yet to transpire. Nevertheless, the article provides a useful conduit to begin 
considering the development of a post-charismatic order in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Indeed, this 
is the kind of move already undertaken by the political opposition and local analysts in Kazakhstan. 
Understanding that the likelihood of Nazarbayev ever voluntarily giving up power is improbable, they 
sought to begin addressing the possibilities of a post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan (Satpayev et al, 2013). 
The above analysis, therefore, hopes to contribute to a discussion on the developmental paths open 
to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in terms of political succession. The analysis implies that options for 
potential pathways for political succession all feature considerable risks and problems, especially with 
regards to elite instability and the further personalisation of power. What the analysis infers is that 
given these issues the process of political succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will potentially 
lead back to a form of reconstituted charisma. 
Hereditary charisma remains an unlikely scenario in both states. On the basis of Rakhat Aliev and 
Gulnara Karimova’s attempts to replace Nazarbayev and Karimov respectively, dynastic succession 
seems doubtful. Neither had suﬃ  cient support among competing elite groups, and in the case of 
Karimova her public designs on the presidency only led to inter-elite instability and her eventual 
downfall. Moreover, hereditary charisma as a pathway, while both Nazarbayev and Karimov are alive, 
is also questionable, given their evident reluctance to have power prised from their hands. Charisma 
in oﬃ  ce also remains challenging as a potential pathway for post-charismatic succession. Despite 
proclamations that the process of constitutional reform in both states since 2007 (in Kazakhstan) and 
2010 (in Uzbekistan) will lead or has led to the divesting of personal presidential power to political 
institutions such as the parliament and political parties, this has not occurred, primarily because 
formal institutions lack agency and autonomy. This is signiﬁ cant because it arguably means that 
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legislatures and parties cannot perform the kind of role imagined through routinisation, whereby 
they would be the mechanism for a smooth transition process to a new president. Besides, side-by-
side with these types of reform in both countries, there has been an increasing personalisation of 
power and reluctance from Karimov and Nazarbayev to countenance giving up power. This means 
that it is designation, underpinned by the legal-rational element of elections, which remains the most 
likely scenario for political succession in both countries, despite the associated problems that come 
with that in terms of the potential reconstitution of charismatic leadership as is evident in the case 
of Turkmenistan. 
How the process of designation unfolds in either case will depend on the political context of inter-
elite competition, and it is here where perhaps Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could depart from the 
Turkmen model. In Uzbekistan there is an absence of a strong business elite, and instead inter-elite 
competition is driven by a factional conﬂ ict between the Tashkent and Samarkand regional clans 
(Satpayev, 2014). Moreover, the strength of the security services in the country (they have been 
fundamental to Karimov’s survival and in containing public discontent), and the prominent position 
of Rustam Inoyatov, indicate these actors will loom large as important agents in the post-charismatic 
succession process. The power of the security services could potentially contain any increasing 
personalisation of the political system under Karimov’s successor. The security services are less pivotal 
to inter-elite dynamics in Kazakhstan – where there is a separate ﬁ nancial elite which possesses a 
degree of autonomy from the president and the state. This autonomous ﬁ nancial elite is less beholden 
to the divisive regional clan factionalism as in Uzbekistan and would ensure to install a ﬁ gure who 
could maintain the economic interests of these diﬀ erent groups. While there is a danger that the 
legitimacy engendered by putting a designated candidate through an electoral process could lead to 
the reconstitution of charisma as in Turkmenistan, this is somewhat oﬀ set by ﬁ nancial autonomy of 
these elites, their ownership of media sources and their separate power bases. 
What does any of the above teach us about charismatic routinisation in a broader sense? It is 
worth bearing in mind that Weber constructed concepts such as charismatic routinisation as ideal 
types. They are abstract concepts which empirical reality can be measured against. Therefore, there 
are limitations of the extent to which the cases of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan can 
inform us of the nature of charisma and charismatic routinisation in a wider sense. Nevertheless, the 
case of these Central Asian states does tell us something about the potentially paradoxical nature of 
charismatic routinisation. When charismatic routinisation is being attempted in a modern political 
context where charismatic domination co-exists with legal-rational and traditional domination, 
these two other forms of domination can act to subvert the process of charismatic routinisation. 
This is despite charismatic routinisation only having two routes available to it: traditional and 
legal-rational. Traditional domination (patrimonial informal elite relations) undermines eﬀ orts of 
hereditary charisma (itself an attempt to routinise charisma into traditional authority) because of how 
it contributes to inter-elite instability and competition for succession. The legal-rational weakens 
charismatic routinisation by the way in which it provides legitimacy separate from the charismatic 
staﬀ  and followers who designate the charismatic successor, thus allowing the successor the political 
space and legitimacy to re-constitute charismatic domination. Therefore, there is something oddly 
paradoxical about the process of charismatic routinisation occurring in these Central Asian states. 
This may be a consequence of the weak nature of legal-rational institutions in these states and their 
inability to defend themselves against the dominance and overbearing nature of personal leadership. 
Nevertheless, it would be thought provoking to observe how these Central Asian states compare to 
processes of charismatic routinisation in other parts of the world such as the post-Chavez order in 
Venezuela.
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